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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to investigate the relationship between gender diversity in a firm’s board 
of directors and financial performance of firms listed on Bursa Malaysia for the period 
between 2009 and 2013. Using unbalanced panel data analysis, we tested whether gender 
diversity in the boardroom may influence the firm’s performance, as measured by Tobin’s 
Q. We employed four different proxies for gender diversity (the dummy variable for women, 
the percentage of women on the board, the Blau index, and the Shannon index) to provide a 
more comprehensive measure of gender diversity. This study suggests that a higher degree 
of female representation on the board increases a firm’s financial performance. Positive 
discrimination favouring female boardroom appointment is therefore likely to persist as a 
feature of the corporate governance landscape in Malaysia. 
Keywords: gender diversity, board of directors, firm performance, corporate governance, 
Shannon index, Blau index, panel data, Malaysia, board composition, female representation 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the collapse of high-profile firms such as Enron in 2001 and WorldCom 
in 2002, good corporate governance practices have been considered crucial and are 
now recognised as being among the driving forces sustaining a firm’s growth in 
the long run. The corporate collapses of the last decade happened due to a lack of 
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corporate monitoring in the firms, which leads to significant agency problems in the 
management and the board of directors. This has resulted in an interest in looking 
at board composition in terms such as the percentage of independent directors, the 
diversity of the directors in terms of gender, education, experience, and age, and 
the networking of the directors. This is crucial as a better mix of directors offers 
greater perspective in decision-making processes (Randøy, Thomsen, & Oxelheim, 
2006). In addition, Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) have also pointed out that 
ethnic and gender diversity among directors provides new and better perspectives 
and, hence, enhanced performance of the firm. 
The corporate governance codes of conduct from both developed and 
developing countries (Norway, Italy, France, Malaysia, and other) have begun 
to impose gender quota systems as an initial measure to increase board diversity 
(Oba & Fodio, 2013). This system has received positive feedback in European 
countries, where the number of women on corporate boards has increased to over 
40% (Corkery & Taylor, 2012). Nevertheless, in developing countries such as 
Malaysia, the corporate boardroom is still skeptical of policies that increase the 
percentage of women directors in the corporate boardroom. This is due to Asian 
cultural differences, according to which women in Asia are expected to have sole 
responsibility for family and household duties (see Chan & Lee, 1994; Omar & 
Davidson, 2001). This cultural difference may limit Asian women from advancing 
to higher positions in the workforce and may thus lead boards to see little evidence 
that gender imbalance affects firm performance. Due to the low number female 
directors in Malaysia, the Prime Minister has further urged that the incidence of 
female board members at government-linked companies and all listed firms be 
raised to 30% by 2016. 
The value of including women in the corporate boardroom is debatable in 
terms of policy implication. This is because empirical evidence of the contribution 
of women directors on firm performance is still unclear. Greater gender diversity 
on the board tends to generate more conflicting opinions, thus leading to inefficient 
and ineffective decision making, which can reduce the firm’s performance 
(Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008). Firms also incur higher costs associated with 
collective decision-making given a diversified board (Daunfeldt & Rudholm, 
2012). In fact, mixed evidence has been reported in countries that have official 
gender quota systems (such as Norway, Italy, and France), with the consensus 
of evidence failing to find any relationship between gender diversity and firm 
performance (Daufeldt & Rudholm, 2012; Rose, 2007). Smith, Smith and Verner 
(2006), on the other hand, found only a weak negative relationship between gender 
diversity and firm performance. 
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Yet empirical studies also suggest the importance of gender diversity 
in producing a better perspective, and hence contributing to better financial 
performance (Dobbin & Jung, 2011; Gul, Hutchinson & Lai, 2013; Marinova, 
Plantenga & Remery, 2010; Rose, 2007). In a similar vein, Dezsö and Ross (2012), 
Rose (2007) and Smith et al. (2006) also found that gender diversity was positively 
related to the firm’s performance in emerging economies. This is consistent with 
the studies of Barnett, Morley and Piterman (2010), Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 
(2003), and Shrader, Blackburn, and Iles (1997), which found that gender diversity 
leads to better financial performance in firms. 
Consequently, it is questionable whether legislation is a good way 
to facilitate greater board gender diversity, as mixed results have been found 
regarding the contribution of women directors to the corporate boardroom. This 
is especially crucial for developing nations that try to implement the gender quota 
system, which may affect the performance of the firms in the long run. In this case, 
we aim to study the effect of gender diversity in the board of directors on financial 
performance among Malaysian public listed firms. We have selected Malaysia as 
the sample for our study because the participation rate of women in the corporate 
boardroom has remained below 10% even four years after the 2011 enforcement 
of the rule requiring that Malaysian boards of directors be composed of at least 
30% women. It is this important to ascertain the performance of the public listed 
companies in Malaysia is not affected with the inclusion of female directors in 
corporate boardrooms in order to convince stakeholders and to fulfill the public 
policy. 
Malaysia has also been selected because it represents the Asian region well 
in terms of cultural diversity, which serves as the main avenue for such study to 
be conducted. Further, to enrich our model estimations, we used multiple proxies 
for gender diversity, including the Blau index of diversity (BLAU), a dummy for 
woman on the board of directors (DWOMEN), the Shannon index of diversity 
(SHANNON), and the percentage of women on board of directors (PWOMEN) by 
controlling the firms’ debt level, return on assets, and firm size. Our study differs 
from earlier studies in the context of Malaysia. In comparison with the study by 
Taghizadeh and Saremi (2013), we have conducted a more robust estimation in 
our gender diversity and firm financial performance investigation. We have used 
Tobin’s Q as our firm’s financial performance proxy, while their study only used 
ROA and ROE. Furthermore, we have applied multiple proxies for our gender 
diversity measurement (BLAU, DWOMEN, SHANNON, and PWOMEN) while 
they focused only on the percentage of women on board of directors. Additionally, 
in comparison with the study of Johl, Kaur and Cooper (2015) which was focused 
on examining the effect of board characteristics on a firm’s ROA, our analysis 
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attempts to identify how gender diversity affects a firm’s financial performance. 
Based on our findings, we found that gender diversity on the boards of Malaysian 
public listed firms is positively related to the firm’s financial performance. This 
provides further support of the implementation of the gender quota policy in the 
country, which aims to increase the performance and long-term survivability of the 
firms in the more complex business world of the future. 
This remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section 
describes the empirical evidence related to gender diversity and firm financial 
performance in various countries. We then explain the development of the 
hypothesis in the subsequent section. This is followed by a discussion of the data 
and estimation models applied in the analysis. Next is a discussion of the empirical 
results and finally, the conclusion. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The topic of board composition is a growing area of study and one of the most 
important variables is the presence of women directors on the board and its 
relationship with firm performance. Research in this area has been prompted by 
the growing concern that women continue to be underrepresented on corporate 
boards in most countries of the world. Although the relationship between board 
gender diversity and firm performance is one of the focuses of related studies, the 
empirical evidence is inconclusive. A great amount of attention has been paid to 
analysing the relationship within mature economies such as the United States and 
Scandinavia, with only a handful studies have been performed using data from 
emerging economies. However, the evidence in these is also mixed. Campbell and 
Minguez-Vera (2008) suggest that these differences may be due to data collected 
from different countries having different board systems and due to different study 
periods. Other than the geographical region, different estimation methods and 
unobserved factors may affect the results. In addition, these differences may also 
be characterised by different cultural, legal, social, and economic environments in 
which the firms are operating. 
Studies of the impact of gender diversity in Asian regions and in developing 
countries are relatively scant because of skepticism about including female 
directors in the corporate boardroom. Johl, Kaur and Cooper (2015) have studied 
the impact of board characteristics and firm performance of 700 public listed firms 
in Malaysia for the year 2009. They found that women’s participation is positively 
related to the return on assets. This is consistent with the work of Taghizadeh and 
Saremi (2013); their study examined 150 public listed firms in Malaysia using 
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data from 2008. Similar results have been found by Fan (2012) for the firms 
listed on the main board of Singapore Exchange; Fan found that gender diversity 
increases the firm’s value as measured by Tobin’s Q. Nevertheless, Marimuthu 
and Kolandaisamy (2009) as well as Shukeri, Shin, and Shaari (2012) found no 
relationship between gender diversity and firm performance for 300 listed firms 
on Bursa Malaysia. 
In addition, factors such as ethnicity and educational background also 
influence the performance of the board. This may be because gender diversity 
provides different perspectives and thought, as well as commitments in terms 
of time, unity, and collegiality, which can contribute positively to the firm’s 
performance (Barnett et al., 2010). In fact, Jhunjhunwala and Mishra (2012), using 
data from 30 firms’ data listed in Sensex, found that board diversity in terms such as 
gender, age, tenure, nationality, educational background, and working experience 
does not contribute to the firm’s performance. 
On the other hand, empirical studies on the contribution of female directors 
in the United States are rather positive. Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader (2003) study 
the relationship between board diversity measured as the percentage of women 
and as female minority on board of directors and firm performance of 127 large 
American firms. They found that a diverse board positively affects the firm’s 
performance measure in terms of return on assets and return on investment. This is 
supported by the study of Carter et al. (2003), where board diversity was found to 
positively relate to the firm’s value. 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Farrell and Hersch (2005) suggest that 
successful firms are more likely to recruit women to top management. They found 
that female directors have significant impact on board input and firm profitability, 
as well as on the value of the firm, which supports the results of Shrader et al. 
(1997) regarding 200 firms listed in the Wall Street Journal.
In addition, Stigring and Lyxell (2011) also found a positive relationship 
between gender diversity and firms’ profitability level as measured by the return 
on assets and return on equity. Nevertheless, their study failed to take into account 
the endogeneity problems and the causal relationship between gender diversity and 
firm performance, as highlighted by Dobbin and Jung (2011). Srinidhi, Gul and 
Tsui (2011) found that a higher number of female directors leads to higher earning 
quality, even after considering the endogeneity problems highlighted above. This 
is also supported by Dezsö and Ross (2012) in their analysis of 1500 firms listed in 
S&P. Gul et al. (2013) further suggest that a positive relationship between gender 
diversity on the board and analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy for 2200 firms 
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listed in the United States. This clearly shows the importance of gender diversity 
in the United States. 
In European and Scandinavia countries, the relationship of the gender 
diversity and various firm’s performance measures (return on assets, return on 
equity, and Tobin’s Q) are rather weak. Bianco, Ciavarella and Signoretti (2011), 
Daunfeldt and Rudholm (2012), Marinova et al. (2010), Randøy et al. (2006), Rose 
(2007), Schwizer, Soana and Cucinelli (2012), and Stigring and Lyxell (2011) 
all failed to identify any significant relationship between gender diversity and 
a firm’s performance measures. Luckerath-Rovers (2011) found that firms with 
female directors performed better in their study of 116 Dutch firms listed on the 
Amsterdam Euronext Stock Exchange. However, Ahern and Dittmar (2006) found 
that the stock prices of Norwegian firms declines with the appointment of women 
directors to fulfill the gender quota system. 
As the results are still mixed in terms of the contribution of gender 
diversity, especially in developing nations, we have further extended the study by 
analysing the gender diversity with different proxies (the Blau index of diversity, 
a dummy for women on the board of directors, the Shannon index of diversity, 
and the percentage of women on board of directors) to confirm the contribution 
of women’s participation in corporate boardrooms. The use of different proxies is 
important to tap into developing markets such as Malaysia, as the percentage of 
woman directors may be low or insignificant; hence the use of different indexes to 
capture the lower representation. 
Hypotheses Development
The relationship between gender diversity in the corporate boardroom and firm 
performance can be explained using the resource-based theory. According to 
resource-based theory, gender diversity in an organisation is view as an intangible 
and socially complex resourced that provides firms with sustainable competitive 
advantage (Grant, 1991; Barney, 2001). This is because gender diversity increases 
creativity and innovation in firms which is considered as valuable, rare, inimitable 
and non-replaceable. This is supported by Carter et al. (2003), Erhardt et al. 
(2003) and Stigring and Lyxell (2011) that found greater gender diversity in the 
boardroom may positively influence a firm’s financial performance (Carter et al., 
2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; Stigring & Lyxell, 2011). The resource-based theory 
highlights the importance of the female directors in the corporate boardrooms 
because it contributes to better synergy from the interaction of male and female 
directors as a source of competitive advantage. In this context, female directors are 
able to provide different perspectives and improve in decision-making processes 
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(Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008) and therefore contribute positively toward firms’ 
performance. Besides, a study by Srinidhi et al. (2011) reveals several mechanisms 
through which female representation on the board of directors may improve the 
firm’s earning quality, through expansion of scope in discussion and decision 
making in the board. In addition, women are said to exhibit greater diligence in 
monitoring and to demand greater accountability for managers’ performance. In 
this case, female directors could improve board oversight and therefore improve 
earnings quality. 
On the other hand, agency theory focuses on the relationship between 
the shareholder and manager relationship. The theory suggests that higher gender 
diversity creates a better control mechanism between the boards and management 
via enhancing boardroom independence and better monitoring system. Besides, 
female directors are able to improve firms’ earning quality through the reduction 
of opportunistic earnings management, because women directors are said to be 
less tolerant of opportunistic behaviour (Srinidhi et al., 2011), hence reduces the 
conflict between the boards and the managers. 
Consequently, gender diversity on the board sends a positive signal to the 
market that the organisation focuses more on corporate governance and that the 
company is doing well, thus improving the firm’s reputation. Larkin, Bernardi and 
Bosco (2012) indicates that interaction between the firm’s recognition and multiple 
female board directors is associated with higher overall returns and lower negative 
returns for stockholders, as measured by market prices of the firm’s common stock. 
We therefore expect that there is a positive and significant relationship between 
board gender diversity and firm financial performance. 
We measure the degree of female representation on the board of directors 
using a dummy variable for women on the board, the percentage of women on the 
board, the Blau index of diversity, and the Shannon index of diversity. The use of 
the Blau and Shannon indices is particularly useful in our study, because they take 
into account the number of gender categories, as well as the distribution of board 
members between them. The Blau index is calculated as P1 ii
n 2
1
-
=
/  where Pi is 
the percentage of board members in each category and n is the total number of 
board members. The Blau index for gender diversity thus lies between 0 and 0.5, 
with a value of 0.5 indicating that the board consists of an equal number of men 
and women.
On the other hand, the Shannon index is calculated as Pii
n
1
-
=
/  where 
Pi and n have the same meanings as in the case of the Blau index. The larger the 
Shannon index, the more diversified is the corporate board structure; in our case, 
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the more diverse in terms of gender. The Blau and Shannon indices both measure 
diversity, though the Shannon index is more sensitive to small changes in the gender 
composition of boards, given that it is calculated as a logarithm of gender diversity 
(Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008). The use of both indices allows us to check 
for consistency and robustness in the results. In this case, a similar hypothesis is 
developed as for female representation, because greater gender diversity may lead 
to more imagination in company strategies and hence in better firm performance. 
Besides, diversity may also improve the decision making of firms from different 
perspectives due to differences in the cognitive levels of males and females. Based 
on this discussion, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between female 
representation on the board of directors and the firm’s financial 
performance. 
H2: There is a significant positive relationship between gender 
diversity (measured by the Blau and Shannon indices) and a firm’s 
financial performance. 
METHODOLOGY 
We used unbalanced panel data analysis based on generalised least square (GLS) 
to ascertain the relationship between women directors and firm performance. The 
use of GLS estimation helps to take into account the unobserved heterogeneity 
that would result in bias. The impact of gender diversity on firm performance is 
estimated using Equation (1):
Q WOMEN LEVER ROA SIZEß ß ß ß ßit it it I itit it0 1 2 3 4 h f= + + + + + +  (1)
where Qit represents Tobin’s Q value for firm i at time t, WOMENit is female 
representation on board of directors for firm i at time t (measured by the four 
alternative variables: the dummy variable for women, the percentage of women 
on the board of directors, the Blau index, and the Shannon index). LEVERit is the 
debt level for firm i at time t, and ROAit is the return on assets for firm i at time t; 
SIZEit denotes the firm’s size for firm i at time t and Ih  represents unobservable 
heterogeneity. 
We employ the pooled ordinary least square (POLS) model in conjunction 
with the fixed effect model (FEM) and the random effect model (REM) for more 
robust estimations. The Breusch–Pagan Lagrange Multiplier is used to decide the 
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appropriateness of the random effects estimation over the normal OLS estimation. 
The rejection of null in the LM test shows the existence of heterogeneity in the 
variables, meaning that the use of OLS may not be appropriate. We then proceed to 
perform the Hausman test to identify whether a correlation between unobservable 
heterogeneity and the explanatory variables exists. This test is used to test the 
correlation between the unique errors (Ui) and the regressors. The rejection of the 
null hypothesis favors the fixed effect model in which unobserved heterogeneity 
and explanatory variables exist (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008). 
Data and Sample 
Panel data analysis is employed to examine the relationship between board gender 
diversity and firm performance. The sample consists of nonfinancial firms listed on 
the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Top 100 Index for the period between 2009 and 2013. 
We used a five-year period to mitigate any potential sample bias due to changes 
from KLCI to FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI. Due to data constraints, we were only 
able to collect a sample of 76 nonfinancial firms and use 336 observations for 
the estimation process. The identities of directors were obtained from the firms’ 
annual reports. From these reports, the number of board members is calculated. 
Accounting data, such as the book value of debt, the book value of total assets, 
and the return on assets were obtained from Bloomberg. Similarly, the number of 
shares and share prices were also obtained from Bloomberg. 
Variables Definition
We use Tobin’s Q as a proxy of firm value to measure the firm’s financial 
performance. Tobin’s Q is calculated using the sum of the market value of stock 
and the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets. We employed 
Tobin’s Q in our study because it reflects the market’s expectation of the firm’s 
competitive advantage. Unlike accounting data that reflects only past performance, 
Tobin’s Q is more forward looking and portrays a firm’s future prospect, given 
the superiority of managerial control. Firms with a high Tobin’s Q of more than 
1.00 have better investment opportunities, higher growth potential, and shows 
indications that management has performed well with its assets (Wolfe & Sauaia, 
2003). Firms with Tobin’s Q ratio of less than 1.00 are associated with poor 
utilisation of available resources (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008). 
We employed different proxies to measure gender diversity. This includes 
the use of the dummy variable for women (DWOMEN), the percentage of women 
on the board (PWOMEN), the Blau index, and the Shannon index. The use of 
various measures enables more comprehensive analysis of female representation 
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in the corporate boardroom. The Blau index is measured as P1 ii
n 2
1
-
=
/  , where 
Pi is the percentage of board members in each category and n is the total number 
of board members. The values of the Blau index range from 0 to a maximum of 
0.5. The maximum value of 0.5 occurs when the firm has an equal number of men 
and women on the board of directors. On the other hand, the Shannon index is 
calculated as P InPii
n
i1=
/ , where Pi and n are similarly the percentage of board 
members in each category and the total number of board members. The values 
for the Shannon index range from 0 to a maximum of 0.69. The maximum value 
of 0.69 occurs when both males and females are present in equal proportions and 
diversity is thus maximised. The advantage of the Blau and Shannon indices is 
that they take into account the number of gender categories as well as the evenness 
of the distribution of the board members among them. The Shannon index is also 
more sensitive to small differences in the gender composition of boards, given 
that it is a logarithm of total assets (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008). Besides 
these indices, we also resort to conventional measures of female representation 
by using the dummy variable for women representing the firm (i.e., when there 
is at least one woman on the board) and also the size of the female representation 
in the boardroom as the percentage of women on the board of directors. Board 
gender diversity is expected to have a positive and significant relationship with 
firm financial performance, given that there are various benefits for appointing 
women to the boardroom, as discussed above. 
Several control variables have also been adopted from the study of 
Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008). Among these are the debt level (LEVER, the 
ratio of total debt to total assets), the return on assets (ROA), and the firm size (SIZE, 
the natural logarithm of total assets). The debt level (LEVER) is used as a control 
variable because a firm’s debt policy is considered to be significant decision that 
influences the firm’s value (Sadeghian, Latifi, Soroush, & Aghabagher, 2012). The 
debt level is expected to have a positive and significant relationship with Tobin’s Q, 
since debt is an efficient mechanism for reducing the agency problem and therefore 
for increasing the firm’s financial performance (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008). 
The return on assets (ROA) is used as a control variable because it is an indicator 
of the firm’s ability to produce income for its shareholders (Carter, D’Souza, 
Simkins, & Simpson, 2010). The return on assets is also expected to have positive 
and significant relationship with Tobin’s Q, since more profitable firms tend to have 
higher value. Firm size (SIZE) is often used as a control variable in the analysis 
of firm financial performance and several studies have shown that asset size is 
related to Tobin’s Q (Yermack, 1996). The firm size is expected to be positively 
and significantly related to Tobin’s Q, since larger firms have greater competitive 
power (Dogan & Yildiz, 2013) and also enjoy the advantage of economies of scale. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
The statistical characteristics for the tested variables are summarised in Table 1. 
Based on this, we see that Tobin’s Q has a mean value of 1.94. This value is close 
to the value obtained by Hillier and McColgan (2001) for the UK market (1.96), 
by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) for the US market (1.10), and by Campbell 
and Minguez-Vera (2008) for the Spanish market (1.64). Firms with a Tobin’s Q 
value of more than 1.00 have better investment opportunities, have higher growth 
potential, and have a management that has managed the assets well. 
The mean value for DWOMEN, which represents the percentage of firms 
with at least one or more women on the board of directors, is 0.54. In other words, 
approximately 54% of Malaysian public listed firms have one or more women on 
board, compared to 70% of US firms, as reported by Farrell and Hersch (2005). 
Surprisingly, the percentage of Malaysian firms having one or more female directors 
is higher than in the Spanish market, where the value is 23.7%, as reported by 
Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008). 
The mean percentage of women on the board of directors, PWOMEN, is 
8.61%. This is higher than the value of 7.5% disclosed by Tan Sri Zarinah of the 
Securities Commission (SC), according to a report by The Edge Financial Daily 
(2011). Bernama (2013) reported that 8.7% of the directors on Malaysian boards 
are women, which is consistent with the result reported in Table 3.1. In the US 
market, Carter et al. (2003) reported a value of 9.6%, while The Catalyst (2004) 
reported a value of 10.2%. The mean percentage of female directors on the boards 
of Malaysian listed firms is much higher than in Spain. Campbell and Minguez-
Vera (2008) reported a value of only 3.28% in the Spanish market. According to PR 
Newswire (2011), Malaysia has the highest percentage of female non-independent 
nonexecutive directors in the Asia Pacific. These female directors on the boards of 
Malaysian firms are likely to be family members. 
The mean values for the BLAU and SHANNON indices are 0.14 and 0.23 
respectively, which compare to the values of 0.05 and 0.09 reported by Campbell 
and Minguez-Vera (2008) in Spain. The results indicate that the board gender 
diversity in Malaysia is greater than that in Spain. The incorporation of women 
into the workplace has been slower in Spain than in other developed countries. 
This could be due to its traditionally deep-rooted societal attitudes towards the 
role of women (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008). Although Malaysian firms tend 
to outperform Spanish firms, the level of board gender diversity is far below the 
perfect diversity score, which is 0.5 for Blau and 0.69 for Shannon. A perfect Blau 
index of 0.5 indicates that the firm has an equal balance of men and women on 
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the board of directors, while a Shannon index of 0.69 means that the firm has 
maximised the number of women on the board of directors. 
The mean value of the leverage variable LEVER is 44%; this can be 
compared to the value of 19% reported by Demsetz and Villalonga (2004) in the US 
and to the value of 38% reported by Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) in Spain. 
Although highly leveraged firms may be at risk of bankruptcy if they are unable 
to make repayment on their debts, high leverage is not necessarily bad. According 
to the agency cost hypothesis, an increase in leverage may reduce agency costs 
and increase firm value by encouraging managers to act more in the interest of the 
shareholders (Grossman & Hart, 1982) through a variety of mechanisms, including 
the monitoring of activities by debt holders, the threat of liquidation (which would 
affect the managers’ reputation and salaries), the pressure to generate cash flow 
for the payment of interest expenses and, finally by curtailing overinvestment 
(reviewed by Zhang & Li, 2008). 
The mean value of the return on assets ROA is 9.14%, while the mean 
value of the firm’s size (taking the natural log of total assets) was found to be 22.31. 
Table 1
Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
Q 1.9375 1.3457 0.4998 13.9825 1.7978 3.5732 18.5832
DWOMEN 0.5357 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4995 -0.1432 1.0205
PWOMEN 0.0861 0.0833 0.0000 0.4444 0.0954 0.9623 3.7175
BLAU 0.1392 0.1528 0.0000 0.4938 0.1426 0.4186 1.8911
SHANNON 0.2274 0.2868 0.0000 0.6870 0.2232 0.1800 1.4619
LEVER 0.4346 0.4275 0.0326 1.3698 0.2032 0.4620 3.8341
ROA 0.0914 0.0642 -0.2023 0.5847 9.0432 2.3143 10.6035
SIZE 22.3050 22.2409 19.4538 25.3187 1.3589 0.0995 2.1504
Notes: Q (approximation of Tobin’s Q), DWOMEN (binary variable that takes a value of 1 where there is at 
least one woman on the board of directors, and 0 otherwise), PWOMEN (percentage of women on the board of 
directors), BLAU (Blau index of diversity), SHANNON (Shannon index of diversity), LEVER (total debt over 
total assets), ROA (return on assets), SIZE (logarithm of the book value of the total assets of the firm).
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Correlation Coefficients 
Table 2
Correlation coefficients between gender diversity proxies and other variables
Panel 1 : DWOMEN
Correlation DWOMEN LEVER ROA SIZE
DWOMEN 1
LEVER 0.0935 1
ROA –0.1296 –0.096 1
SIZE 0.1153 0.3201 –0.4618 1
Panel 2 : PWOMEN
Correlation PWOMEN LEVER ROA SIZE
PWOMEN 1
LEVER 0.0763 1
ROA –0.1441 –0.096 1
SIZE 0.1512 0.3201 –0.4618 1
Panel 3 : Blau Index
Correlation BLAU LEVER ROA SIZE
BLAU 1
LEVER 0.0899 1
ROA –0.1415 –0.096 1
SIZE 0.147 0.3201 –0.4618 1
Panel 4: Shannon Index
Correlation SHANNON LEVER ROA SIZE
SHANNON 1
LEVER 0.095 1
ROA –0.1408 –0.096 1
SIZE 0.1394 0.3201 –0.4618 1
Notes: DWOMEN (binary variable that takes a value of 1 where there is at least one woman on the board 
of directors, and 0 otherwise), PWOMEN (percentage of women on the board of directors), BLAU (Blau 
index of diversity), SHANNON (Shannon index of diversity), LEVER (total debt over total assets), ROA 
(return on assets), SIZE (logarithm of the book value of the total assets of the firm).
Severe multicollinearity occurs when two explanatory variables are 
significantly related in the sample. When explanatory variables are highly 
correlated, it becomes difficult to estimate the coefficients accurately. As a rule 
of thumb, multicollinearity is a concern if the absolute value of simple correlation 
coefficients exceeds 0.80 (Studenmund, 2011). The results presented in Table 2 
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show that the independent variables (DWOMEN, PWOMEN, the Blau index and 
the Shannon index) are not highly correlated with the other explanatory variables, 
which are the control variables (LEVER, ROA and SIZE). 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results of the study are presented in Table 3. Estimation is carried out using 
the pooled ordinary least square (POLS) model, the fixed effect model, and the 
random effect model. The results of all models are presented for comparison. The 
Hausman test, the Breusch–Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test, and the F-test are 
performed to determine which of the pooled ordinary least square model, fixed 
effect model, and random effect model is more appropriate. The results indicate 
that the fixed effect model is more appropriate. The results for the fixed effect 
model are therefore analysed and discussed. 
The results of the Breusch–Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test in Table 3 show 
that the null hypothesis is rejected and the random effect model is more appropriate 
over the pooled ordinary least square model. Similarly, the F-test results indicate 
that the fixed effect model is more appropriate than the pooled ordinary least square 
model. When the random effect model is compared to the fixed effect model using 
the Hausman test, the null hypothesis is rejected; the fixed effect model is thus 
employed for analysis and discussion. 
The results in Table 3 show that the performance of firms with female 
directors does not differ significantly from that of firms without female directors. 
However, based on Table 3, our hypotheses H1 and H2 are fully supported, 
where Tobin’s Q and three proxies (BLAU, SHANNON, and PWOMEN) are 
statistically highly significant. Our findings suggest that a higher percentage of 
women directors in the corporate boardroom increases the firm’s value. This is 
consistent with the study of Johl et al. (2015), which found that the participation 
of women was positively related to the return on assets for 700 public listed firms 
in Malaysia. Similarly, Taghizadeh and Saremi (2013) also found that female 
directors contribute positively to the performance of 150 public listed firms in 
2008. The results are also consistent with studies found in the US, where female 
directors have been found to improve the firm’s profitability (Adams & Ferreira, 
2009; Erhardt et al., 2003; Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Stigring & Lyxell, 2011) and 
value (Srinidhi et al., 2011). 
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Table 3
Estimation results for women director on firm’s Tobin’s Q
 Dependent Variable - Tobin’s Q
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 6.6279
(3.8107)
8.5999
(3.7747)
8.4503
(3.7839)
8.0489
(3.7940)
DWOMEN 0.2499
(0.1635)
– – –
PWOMEN – 3.1716***
(0.8985)
– –
BLAU – – 1.9788***
(0.5917)
–
LEVER 3.6450***
(0.7217)
3.6193***
(0.7072)
3.6318***
(0.7089)
3.6333***
(0.7121)
ROA 0.1060***
(0.0118)
0.1067***
(0.0116)
0.1064***
(0.0116)
0.1061***
(0.0117)
SIZE –0.3308*
(0.1719)
–0.4252**
(0.1703)
–0.4187**
(0.1708)
–0.3997**
(0.1713)
Model fit:
R-squared 0.6693 0.6455 0.6477 0.6525
Redundant fixed effect 5.02*** 5.30*** 5.24*** 5.17***
BP-LM test 86.20*** 91.26*** 90.46*** 89.33***
Hausman test 36.35*** 39.52*** 39.09*** 38.24***
Notes: *, **, *** Denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis. Tobin’s Q (sum of market value of stock and book value of debt divided by book 
value of total assets), DWOMEN (binary variable that takes a value of 1 where there is at least one woman 
on the board of directors, and 0 otherwise), PWOMEN (percentage of women on the board of directors), 
BLAU (Blau index of diversity), SHANNON (Shannon index of diversity), LEVER (total debt over total 
assets), SIZE (logarithm of the book value of the total assets of the firm), ROA (return on investment).
In addition, we found that both the Blau and Shannon indices are positively 
related to the firm’s Tobin’s Q, with statistical significance at the 1% significance 
level. This confirms that female representation in the board of directors enhances 
the firm’s value and suggests that a mixture of men and women is important to 
forming a stronger board that boosts the firm’s performance. This may be due 
to greater gender diversity offering a broader perspective in terms of decision 
making, as the directors come from different demographic backgrounds. This 
is supported by studies in gender diversity, where higher female representation 
contributes to higher quality decisions, to increases in creativity and innovation 
(Cox & Blake, 1991; Westphal & Milton, 2000), and to enhancing problem-solving 
ability (Miller, Burke, & Glick, 1998). In addition, the differences of the women’s 
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demographic background as compared to men offers variety in terms of personality, 
communication style, educational background, career experience, and expertise 
(Liao, Luo, & Tang, 2015), which contribute to a wider perspective in decision 
making and strategic planning. This contributes positively to the firms’ value 
and hence increases their competitive advantage. According to Kramer, Maguire, 
Brewer, Chmielewski, Kishner and Krugman (2007), women demonstrate a strong 
collaborative leadership style that promotes win-win situations at the board table, 
which can enhance the firm’s decision-making process.
The results of Table 3 also indicate that higher leverage increases the 
firm value and that this is statistically significant at the 1% significance level for 
all the models. This is consistent with the study of Grossman and Hart (1982), 
who suggested that higher leverage encourages managers to act in the interest of 
shareholders and hence to reduce the agency problem. This is because managers 
are now not answerable only to the shareholders, but also to the creditors, to whom 
they must pay off their long-term obligations. This will eventually reduce the 
motivation of managers to engage in risky activities, thus increasing the firm’s 
value. In addition, Signaling Theory suggests that firms signal their quality with 
an optimal combination of dividends and leverage. In this case, signals of high 
leverage to the investors can suggest an optimistic future and a higher quality firm. 
Modigliani and Miller’s theorem also asserts that firms are capable of increasing 
their value by taking on additional debt, because it could give advantage in terms 
of tax savings. 
The results indicate that the return on assets is positively related to firm 
value at the 1% significance level. This is consistent with the expectation that 
higher profits help to increase the firm’s value. According to Haugen and Baker 
(2010), the greater the profitability of a firm, the greater the distribution of earnings 
to the shareholders, and therefore the greater the expected value of the firm. The 
return on assets is crucial because it indicates the efficiency of the management in 
managing the assets, and is hence a positive measure of firm value (Chen, Chen, 
Lobo, & Wang, 2011). 
On the other hand, we found that firm size is negatively related to firm 
value. This contradicts the expectation that larger firms have greater competitive 
power and are more likely to enjoy economies of scale and greater bargaining power 
than clients and suppliers (Serrasqueiro & Paulo, 2008). Our results are consistent 
with the study by Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008). This finding implies that a 
firm will exhibit decreasing returns with scale because when it reaches an optimal 
size, its growth rate will decrease, affecting in turn the firm’s value.
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CONCLUSION 
Previous studies have suggested that gender diversity in the boardroom tends to 
lead to better financial performance on the part of the firm. This scenario may be 
different in Asia, where gender diversity may not increase a firm’s performance. 
To determine if this is the case, we investigated the effects of gender diversity on 
firms’ financial performance in Malaysia. Unlike previous researchers, we used 
nonfinancial firms listed on Bursa Malaysia for the period spanning from 2009 to 
2013. Using the pooled ordinary least square model, the fixed effect model, and 
the random effect model, we tested whether gender diversity in the boardroom 
influences a firm’s performance. In our estimation models, we include Tobin’s Q as 
our dependent variable and four different proxies for gender diversity (the dummy 
variable for women, the percentage of women on the board, the Blau index, and the 
Shannon index), controlling with the firm’s debt level, return on assets and size.
Based on our results, we failed to find any relationship between the presence 
of women on board and firm performance. However, the percentage of women on 
the board, the Blau index, and the Shannon index were positively and significantly 
related to firm performance. This suggests that the mere fact of there being at least 
one female on the board has no impact on firm performance, but a higher degree 
of female representation does increase the firm’s financial performance. This may 
reflect the fact that the presence of female directors on the board generates a greater 
market expectation of the firm’s competitive advantages, which are reflected by an 
increase in the value of the firm, as suggested by Tobin’s Q. This is because a greater 
representation of women is expected to contribute a different perspective, as well as 
more comprehensive thinking in the decision-making process, which is crucial for 
firms’ strategic decision making and for ensuring their long-term performance. This 
could be due to the socialisation process whereby unconventional female directors 
adopt the behavior and norms of conventional male directors to be recognised by 
top decision makers (Rose, 2007). Consequently, the advantages of having females 
on the board of directors are not reflected in the measure of firm performance 
and, as a result, positive discrimination favoring female boardroom appointment 
is likely to persist as a feature of the corporate governance landscape in Malaysia. 
Consistent with the literature, we infer that the debt level and return on assets of a 
firm are significantly positively correlated with firm financial performance, while 
firm size is significantly negatively correlated with it.
One limitation of this study is that the results are valid only for Malaysian 
firms and cannot be generalised to firms in other countries, which may have 
different legal and cultural attributes. Malaysia may suffer from the weak corporate 
governance common to many developing countries. Therefore, it is important to 
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determine the strength of corporate governance in Malaysia and its association 
with the relationship between board gender diversity and firm performance. It is 
also unclear whether the appointment of female directors in Malaysian firms is 
socially motivated. Malaysian firms have high levels of family ownership, and so 
it is unclear whether board members are nominated by family members so as to 
permit continuity of the family business. To address these issues, future research 
needs to account for corporate governance and the family ownership structure in 
the estimation model.
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